Abstract-We seek a simple model that describes how market forces acting on rational players result in the evolution of the multi-faceted topology of the Internet that we see today. We model the system based on two levels of dynamic engagement of players-at the global level with clusters of ASs operating in fixed regions, and at the regional level where each AS tries to make appropriate decisions to increase its sphere of influence. Regions appear on the map at a rate based on global market conditions. The economic relationships between two regions are decided by the dominant ASs in that region. Within each region, ASs appear at a rate based on the economy of the region. The relationships between these ASs follow from the economics of connectivity within the region. We show that this two-level model naturally produces a topology similar to the current AS-level topology. Based on measured economic details, the model explains both the observed power-law node degree distribution and the exact value of the power-law exponent γ ∼ 2.2. Using our model, we also demonstrate that topological awareness of Internet players naturally leads to consolidation of providers over time, unless some exogenous force interferes. We validate our model using historical and current measurements from BGP routing tables.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past decade we have seen extraordinary and relentless growth of Internet connectivity around the world, accelerated by the emergence of (dense) wavelength division multiplexing, which allowed fiber owners to provision high bandwidth point-to-point links at an extremely low premium on existing fiber. However, Internet growth has not been uniform around the world-some regions have developed much more rapidly than others. Figure 1 illustrates the non-uniform structure of Internet connectivity. Different regions have different numbers of Internet Service Providers (ISPs). Each ISP has its "cloud" of customers associated with it. Each company with its own routing domain is roughly represented as an Autonomous System (AS) in the global routing system. An AS might be a transit ISP or a content provider or sink, or a combination of these. Some regions are tightly interconnected, with many different ASs, while others are connected by only a few links. Different regions of the world have vastly different regulatory structures, available resources and content demand, which leads one to expect that the global AS-level graph structure would not be particularly uniform across regions. However, in 1999 Faloutsos et al. [1] observed that this global diversity is unified by a simple power law distribution of AS degrees. Several researchers have studied why power law distributions arise in so many complex systems-from metabolic reactions, to relations between words in languages, to citation graphs of papers. Although progress has been made in generating synthetic graphs exhibiting such properties, a unified theory of the driving forces behind formation of such structures eludes us.
The Internet vivifies this interdisciplinary theme since it increasingly modulates our daily lives, and understanding its structure and evolution will correspondingly increase in priority. We can study the Internet as a set of ASs, each operating with its own constraints and trying to maximize its own payoff. Several researchers have pursued this approach, treating the Internet both as a fixed system [2] - [5] , as well as an evolving one [6] - [8] . However, while the fixed system approach has had significant research attention, questions regarding the main economic drivers behind Internet topology evolution remain.
In this paper our main objective is to understand the impact of the diverse range of circumstances that influence Internet growth-regulatory actions, geographical separation, economic growth rate and routing decisions of ASs. We want to understand how varied circumstances in different corners of the globe manage to generate economic decisions that induce a distinct structure on the Internet AS-level graph. We also seek a model to predict how this structure will likely evolve in the future.
Related Work
The study of Internet AS-level topology was first made possible by the RouteViews project [9] , which archives snapshots of BGP tables observed at several different locations. Using RouteViews data, Faloutsos et al. [1] first observed an unexpected phenomenon: the node degree distribution of the global Internet's AS topology followed a power law. Deep controversy in subsequent works focused on whether the observed node degree distributions are indeed power laws [10] , [11] or whether they may be artifacts of sampling biases associated with topology measurement techniques [12] , [13] . However, recent research [14] - [16] suggests that although some deviations of the real topology from observed power laws are possible, they must be fairly weak deviations.
The question of how such power law graphs arise naturally has also interested physicists. Barabási and Albert [17] demonstrated how a simple linear preferential attachment scheme, in which incoming nodes prefer to attach to high degree nodes, results in a power law graph with exponent 3. The attachment scheme was subsequently modified to include re-wirings that allowed the exponent to be between 2 and 3 [18] . Krapivsky and Redner [19] showed that if preference is superlinear, it leads to topological "consolidation"-almost all nodes are of low degrees and connected to a tiny number of high-degree nodes; this number is finite even in the infinite network limit.
In the case of the Internet AS-level topology, the availability of formal tools from physics has driven the construction of models with preference functions that reproduce the AS topological structure. In 2002, Bu and Towsley [20] used a generalized preference function to construct graphs that show similarities to the AS-level graph's clustering coefficient as well as the power-law exponent. Zhou and Mondragon [21] attempted to refine the preference function to match the exact power law of the AS-level graph. In contrast, Fabrikant et al. [22] in their Heuristically Optimized Trade-offs (HOT) model used the Highly Optimized Tolerance (also HOT) approach proposed in [23] to generate Internet-like graphs.
Since the Internet has been largely unregulated and privately provisioned for at least a decade, it is logical to assume that the underlying structure and relationships in the Internet arise naturally from the economics of deploying and maintaining infrastructure. Models have been proposed to study economic relations between providers [2] , [4] , [5] . These studies seek models of how and when ISPs peer with each other and the impact of such decisions on customer prices. Laffont et al. [2] showed that in a fairly general scenario, an ISP would price customers as if their traffic was either generated or destined outside that ISP's network. Shakkottai and Srikant [4] extended this work with two major elements-the fact that ISPs are geographically separated and the fact that they operate through an economic hierarchy. More recently, Shrimali and Kumar [5] showed that if the costs incurred by ISPs before engaging in peering are the same, then all ISPs make (weakly) higher profits by peering.
Inference of business relationships between ASs based on observed AS connectivity has also made progress this decade. Gao [24] showed that it is feasible to infer relationships between different ASs by analyzing BGP data. Subramanian et al. [25] formalized and refined Gao's heuristics. Dimitropoulos et al. [26] , [27] further improved the accuracy of these methods. The other question that arises in studying AS economics is taxonomizing ASs, e.g., large or small ISPs, content source or sink. Dimitropoulos et al. [28] offer a promising starting point for research in this direction.
Two recent studies have tried to understand the relationship between economics and evolution [7] , [8] , although without delving into the economic drivers behind connection decisions. Wang and Loguinov [7] assume a model in which each AS is associated with a measure of its wealth. They show that the distribution of AS wealth in the system follows a power law, and further assert that an AS would have a number of connections proportional to its wealth at the time, either by making or breaking links at will. Thus, a power law in wealth implies a power law in connectivity. New connections are formed with a random walk to explore geographically close ASs, rather than grounded in economic constraints. Chang et al. [8] offers a complex model that significates geography by saying that a high-degree node is likely to have a large number of geographically distributed points of presence (POPs) and so is more likely to be selected by an incoming AS. They further explore factors that influence the peering decision-making process-cost and nearness for small ASs, and connectivity for larger ASs. However, they assume that all geographically localized POPs would be equally attractive to an entering AS. We build upon these studies by extracting the salient features of each model and adding important extensions.
Main Results
We extend the static model in our previous work [4] with inputs from the evolutionary model in Chang et al. [8] . The basic elements of our model are as follows. We divide the ASs into regional clusters. Regions appear on the map at a rate based on the state of the world economy. Within a region, ASs appear at a rate based on the regulations and economy of the region. ASs are of two kinds-ISPs and non-ISPs, with the main difference between them being that while both ISPs and non-ISPs can connect to ISPs, no new AS would connect to an existing non-ISP since it cannot provide Internet connectivity. Sometimes ISPs are referred to as transit-ISPs to highlight the fact that they provide transit between content providers and sinks. However, we will use the term ISP for convenience.
Our model for connectivity between regions follows Chang et al.'s [8] idea that the highest priority for a major AS is to connect to ASs that are geographically diverse. The major ASs of a region would thus establish connections with ASs in a different region based on that region's popularity, determined by the number of regions connected to it. Similarly, our model for connectivity between ASs within a region recognizes policy-based routing as a manifestation of economic forces that constrain the evolution of topology. Specifically, economic considerations motivate connection decisions that will ensure carriage of packets at the lowest possible cost, and policy-based routing allows one to engineer traffic flow based on this economic constraint rather than based on the shortest hop path. We will show that when the ASs have no information regarding the economic relationships between possible service providers, but know only the degree of those providers, the relative popularity of the candidate ISPs is proportional to their degrees. We also consider secondorder effects, such as the formation of peering links within and between regions, as well as the merger of ASs to form siblings.
We show analytically that our model produces a topology where the degree k has a distribution P(k) ∼ k −γ , which is the classic power law. We show using the measured ratios of ISPs to non-ISPs, that our model produces the power law exponent of 2.2 which perfectly matches the measured value. The result is a natural effect of there being far more non-ISPs than ISPs, something earlier work has not considered.
We then consider the case in which arriving ASs have some information about the existing topology. For example, they could be aware that the topology follows a power law, and make routing decisions based on this information. We show that under this circumstance, the preference function is superlinear and will lead toward coalescence of the graph into regions with a few (asymptotically, a single) dominant providers per region.
Applying this model to Internet evolution leads to the following unexpected findings. Policy routing based on hierarchical economic relationships between providers who are unaware of the topology yields a power law AS topology, but once providers have access to sufficient topological information and start making decisions based on it, the AS topology will eventually consolidate toward regional monopolies. In other words, our model predicts that natural economic forces among rational free actors will take an AS topology degree distribution from a smooth power law toward a modicum of high degree nodes, e.g., vertically integrated monopoly regional providers, linked up by backbones.
Organization of the Paper
We begin in Section II with a review of relevant results on evolution of networks. Section III divides the Internet into regions with ASs being the constituent members of each region and develops the basic aspects of how to model the economic and non-economic forces driving the ASs' decisions. In Section IV we build an evolutionary model of the Internet topology growth and analytically show how the model produces the structure that we see today. In Section V we study the decisions that are likely to shape the future Internet. Section VI summarizes and concludes.
II. BASIC IDEAS ON GRAPH EVOLUTION
We first introduce the basic concepts of network evolution that we will use in this paper, borrowing from Dorogovstev and Mendes' comprehensive reference [29] . A fundamental contribution in this area is the Barabási-Albert preferential attachment model, which was extended in 2001 to capture superlinear preference [19] . We present results from both. In the linear-preference model, nodes appear at a constant rate and become attached to old ones with a probability proportional to their degrees as illustrated in Figure 2 . Suppose that nodes arrive in the system at the rate of one node per unit time and attach to one node each. Let them be numbered s = 1, 2, 3, ... as they arrive. Then the number of nodes in the system at time t is equal to t. The probability that a node of degree k gets a new connection is its degree divided by the total number of links in the system, which is simply
Similarly, the probability that it remains unchanged is 1 − k 2t . We use the notation p(k, s, t) to denote the probability that a node s has degree k at time t. Then the equation describing the distribution of individual nodes is
with the initial condition p(k, s = 1, t) = δ k,2 and boundary condition p(k, s = 2, t) = δ k,2 . We use δ i,j to denote the Kronecker delta function. 1 We denote the average degree of node s at time t to bē
Then we have from (1) that the equation that describes the evolution of the average degrees of vertices is
with the boundary conditionk(s = t, t > 2) = 1. It can be shown that the solution for equation of the above type is of formk(s, t) ∼ (s/t) −α , where α = 1/2 in this case. We denote the degree distribution of the entire network at time t by
The equation describing the stationary distribution can be shown to be
whose solution is of form P(k) ∼ k −γ for large k, with γ = 3, which is a typical power law.
A simple expression links the two parameters α and γ
This result is true for all scale-free growing networks. As previously mentioned, the preferential growth model has been extended for the case when the preference function is superlinear [19] . That is, instead of a linear preference of the form k 2t , the probability of an incoming node attaching to a node of degree k is now
where β > 1 and the sum is over all nodes. It can be shown that for β > 2 all but a finite number of nodes have degree 1, even for arbitrary large networks. More generally [30] , when 1 +
. ., the number of nodes having degrees higher than p remains finite even in the infinite network size limit. When p → ∞, β → 1 and we slowly approach power law asymptotic growth, crossing an infinite series of phase transitions at every value of p.
III. THE INTERNET ECOSYSTEM
We study the Internet using a two-tier structure: Internet Region: A portion of the Internet, usually defined by geographical boundaries. A region may be a whole country, a state, or a smaller entity. The constituent players of a particular region are ASs. Within the region, all ASs face a similar set of legal regulations and are aware of each other. The cost of obtaining links to connect to different existing service providers in a region is often similar as well.
Autonomous System (AS): A single network or a group of networks controlled by a common administrator on behalf of an entity such as a transit ISP, content provider, or content sink. An autonomous system is assigned a globally unique number. Usually when a business is established it obtains service as a customer of an existing Internet service provider, which allocates a part of its own provider address space to this customer. Such a business can be called a "proto-AS". After gaining sufficient economic strength, the proto-AS might desire to manage its own routing and partnership decisions. In pursuit of this goal the growing business would apply to the Regional Internet Registry (RIR) for its region (e.g., ARIN in North America) for its own independent address space. Upon demonstrating need, intent, and the resources sufficient to support a differentiated routing policy (e.g., connecting to at least two other ASs, aka multihoming), a proto-AS may receive temporary rights of exclusive use of IP address space and an AS number from a RIR. These number resources identify this business to the global routing system. Note that the requirement of routing policy differentiation, almost always for the purpose of multihoming, is explicitly written into the administrative requirements for allocation of an AS number [31] , [32] . As a consequence, the number of observed 2-degree ASs is greater than the number of 1-degree ASs [16] .
AS topology maps constructed thus far do not differentiate among AS types. However, there are three distinct functions of ASs: providing content, transport, and eyeballs (or sinking content). We merge ASs who primarily contribute content or eyeballs into non-ISPs, yielding two categories:
• Internet Service Providers (ISPs) whose purpose is the carriage of packets.
• Non-ISPs who pay for the carriage of packets. Note that both ISPs and non-ISPs can be customers of an ISP, but an ISP can never be a customer of an non-ISP. In what follows, we will refer to any AS that obtains service from an ISP as its customer AS.
Impact of World Economy and Regional Regulations
An essential communications policy question is how the regulatory framework in a region drives the growth of the Internet there. In this context, Vest [33] observes that regulatory factors may determine both the number of ISPs and its growth in a given region. Consider Figure 3 which shows the variation in production of new ASs obtained from RouteViews data since its collection began [9] . In Asia, deregulation has contributed to a steady increase in the growth of ASs. In contrast, the increase caused by the dot-com bubble in North America slowed after 2001. 
Modeling Decision
We capture the disparate factors such as regulatory, economic and infrastructure issues in terms of two parameters: 
Connectivity Between Regions
We now consider the issue of connectivity. A new ISP in a new region must decide which ISP in which region to connect to. The problem seems straightforward; the ISP is interested in accessing the customer ASs of the other regions. The choice then becomes that of identifying the most popular region, which can be done by checking the number of regions that connect to each region. Popularity of different regions depends on a variety of parameters including infrastructure and content available.
Note that as far as the ASs within a target region are concerned, an inter-regional link is a link that appears with one end in the region and seeks to be connected to some ISP there. Since the rate of arrival of such links would be correlated with the arrival rate of regions, as well as the popularity of the region, we model them together using one parameter that represents the process of forming inter-regional connections.
Modeling Decision
We incorporate inter-regional linkage request arrivals into the region arrival process, and model both together as the rate at which links from outside the region appear in the region. This rate can differ by region.
Interconnections Within a Region
Modeling connections formed within a region is not as simple. An ISP requesting an inter-regional link must decide which regional ISP to choose. An AS appearing in an established region must decide from which ISP to obtain service. Existing ASs within a region must decide on whether or not to establish new links with other ASs. Some ASs will fail and be acquired by other ASs. We argued in the previous section that regions of ASs would be interested in ensuring that they are able to access the largest amount of content. We now need to understand economic intra-dependencies among ASs within a region. The Internet has a hierarchy of providers [34] shown in Figure 5 . An ISP charges its customer ASs regardless of traffic direction [34] , [35] . For both regional and inter-regional traffic, the shortest path in economic terms may be quite different from the shortest path in terms of hop count. For example, a Tier 1 provider's economic distance to the entire Internet is zero. Since BGP is a policy-based routing protocol, the most important decision that an AS makes is from which ISP to obtain service, since this decision determines its economic distance to all other ASs. If an AS could obtain quotes from all its potential service providers and then decide, it could make a closer to optimal choice. However, in practice such omniscience is rarely (if ever) possible and decisions are taken bilaterally, not through an auction.
Let us consider the costs involved in choosing one ISP versus another. An ISP must charge its customer ASs at least as much as it pays to the higher level ISP from which it obtains service. (Note that we do not consider "frictional" technological and environmental factors such as multiplexing to serve more customers with the same resources, selling IP transit below cost, or selling a qualitatively different products, e.g., with different levels of service or features to the customer.) Formally, if the demand for service (in terms of traffic units) as a function of price charged is n(p), where p is the price charged per unit traffic, then a higher tier ISP would maximize revenue:
where p 1 is the price charged per unit traffic and c 1 is the running cost per unit traffic and pricing is usage-based. Rationality requires that p 1 ≥ c 1 . Whereas, its customer ISP would maximize
where p 2 is the price charged and c 2 is its running cost. Again, rationality requires that p 2 ≥ p 1 + c 2 . Note that the ISPs can maximize their revenues as above only if the potential customer ASs are unaware of the prices charged by all the competing service providers. Otherwise the market would work as a pure price-competition. The above observation suggests that the guiding philosophy behind an AS that wishes to obtain service from an ISP would be to pick one higher in the hierarchy. The hierarchy is unknown to ASs, but it does not mean that the customer ASs make blind decisions. The most basic statistic about an AS is its degree, i.e., how may other ASs it connects to, which is immediately available from its routing table. A potential customer AS can assume that almost all links to a given ISP are from that ISPs customers (this fact was shown in [28] ). Figure 6 illustrates two ISPs that offer connectivity to the Internet. A potential customer must decide which ISP to connect to, which for a rational actor turns out to equal to the decision of which ISP is more likely the customer of the other. A key insight is that if an AS is unaware of the nature of the topology, it would rank the importance of connecting to each of the ISPs by the likelihood of one being the customer of the other. Figure 6 shows ISP A's degree at 7, while ISP B's degree is 3. Under the assumption that links are almost always customer links, the chance that ISP B is ISP A's customer is 7 10 , while the chance that A is B's customer is 3 10 . The attractiveness of an ISP as a possible service provider is thus directly proportional to its degree, which means we can use an "attraction model" [3] . Each ISP has an attractiveness that is proportional to its likelihood of being chosen by a customer.
Modeling Decision

We model the attractiveness of an ISP s that has degree k, to an inter-regional link, a newly formed ISP or a new non-ISP, when the total number of links in the region is t, by
Note that the above expression leads to a linear dependence of the attractiveness of an ISP to its degree.
Second Order Effects
AS relationships are not necessarily static. Bilateral settlements may reciprocally set termination charges to zero, also known as peering. The point of peering is that if the traffic flow in both directions between two ISPs is similar, then peering allows ISPs to reduce transit costs and simplifies accounting in the case of Tier 1 ISPs. However, a peering link is not free. The cost per unit traffic on a peering link is inversely proportional to the amount of traffic carried on it [35] . So ISPs will generally require similar, large volumes of traffic exchanges to justify peering. Under the assumption that all customer ASs generate similar volumes of traffic, it would follow that peering links would be established preferentially between large degree ASs.
The idea that ISPs should consider the degree of potential peers is not speculation. Many ISPs actually list a peering degree requirement before they will consider peering [33] . For example, MCI (a Tier 1 ISP, now to be merged with Verizon Business) states that it would consider peering requests only if the degree of the requesting ISP is at least 1500 [36] .
We also have to consider the effects of bankruptcy and formation of siblings. When ISPs go bankrupt, their infrastructure is usually acquired by another ISP, which then either merges both or forms a "sibling" relationship with it in which their routing domains appear independent but are controlled by one umbrella organization. Since high degree ISPs tend to be wealthier, they are likely to be involved in such takeovers. Thus, such relationships would be preferentially formed with higher degree ISPs.
Modeling Decision
We model peering links as appearing in a region at a fixed rate. Peering links are formed preferentially between nodes proportional to the product of their degrees.
We model bankruptcy among ISPs as occurring at some fixed rate in a region. Failed ISPs are taken over by other ISPs with a preference proportional to their degrees.
IV. EVOLUTIONARY MODEL: THE POWER LAW DISTRIBUTION
We are now ready to formalize the modeling decisions of the previous section and develop an analytical model for the evolution of the AS-level graph. Let the set of all world regions be R. We study the processes driving the topology of a particular region r ∈ R.
We model the various processes that occur in a region, and show in Figure 7 a subset of possible peering-related events:
we model this event by the appearance of one new ISPnode per unit time. The node would attach (multihome) with linear-preference to m existing ISP-nodes.
• New non-ISPs appear in the region at some rate. Note that they cannot be represented by ISP-nodes since no further attachments can take place to a non-ISP. We represent them by non-ISP-links that attach to existing ISP-nodes with a linear preference. Let the rate at which non-ISP links appear be ρm per unit time.
• Requests for connectivity from other regions appear at some rate. Similar to non-ISP-nodes, the nodes from other regions do not appear in the regional graph, but their links do. Let the rate of appearance of these links be εm per unit time. They attach to ISP-nodes with a linear preference.
• ISPs in the system make peering decisions and build links between existing ISPs. The decisions are made preferentially by higher degree ISPs. Let the rate at which new links appear be cm per unit time. The probability that a new link becomes attached to a pair of ISP-nodes of degree k 1 and k 2 is proportional to the product k 1 k 2 .
• ISPs go bankrupt and are acquired by other ISPs. The ISPs that acquire them are preferentially chosen. We model this event by randomly rewiring m p links to ISPnodes chosen with linear preference. We assume that the rate of this process is relatively low, m p ≪ m.
Sibling
New ISP New end−host or inter−regional link Peering Fig. 7 . Processes that drive evolution in a region.
We now proceed in the fashion outlined in Section II to obtain the following result:
Proposition 1: The attachment model outlined above yields a power law topology with an exponent
Proof: The continuum model for the evolution of average degree of nodes is given by, ∂k(s, t) ∂t
with boundary conditionk(t, t) = m. The expression is obtained by considering the fact that at time t, the total degree of the ISP nodes in the region is
which implies that the probability of a link connecting to a node of degree k is k ρm + εm + 2m + 2cm (14) Now, the number of links entering the system at time t is
Then (14) and (15) together yield the first term in the r.h.s. of (12) . The second term follows from the fact that there are t nodes in the system at time t, all equally likely to lose m p links. The solution of the differential equation (12) is
where
Finally, we use relation (6) to finish the proof. The result is independent of the node arrival rate. Even with different rates of events in different regions, the result is always a power-law degree distribution, with an exponent that depends only on the relative fractions of different events.
The result that the degree distributions in different regions all follow power laws is supported by Zhou et al. [37] , who have shown that China's AS-level topology shows a power law graph with an identical exponent to the whole AS graph. A similar observation was made by Mahadevan et. al. [38] in that the WHOIS data restricted to European ASs displays the same properties as the global WHOIS data. The observation is consistent with the scale-free or self-similar nature of powerlaw degree distribution, i.e., random subsets of nodes from a power-law graph have the power-law degree distribution with the same exponent. If we know that the degree distribution in each region follows a power law with the same exponent, the following corollary holds Corollary The degree distribution of the world's AS level topology is given by
where γ is as defined in the previous proposition.
Verification Using Measured Data
We use measured average values of the different parameters to calculate the value of γ. Our first parameter, ρ, is the ratio of non-ISP to ISP links appearing in the system per time step (each time step adds one ISP-node). It is impossible to measure this parameter directly, but we can closely estimate it assuming that all ASs multihome to the same number of ISPs upon arrival, which would mean that ρ is the same as the ratio of non-ISPs to ISPs. Dimitropoulos et. al [28] observed in 2006 that the number of ISPs was about 30% of ASs, while non-ISPs occupied the other 70%. This finding implies that ρ ∼ 7/3 ∼ 2.3. Next, in [27] the same authors show that roughly 90% of links are customer provider links, while 10% are peering. The rate at which customer-provider links appear in the system is proportional to 1 + ρ + ε. We can obtain a lower bound on c, by assuming that ε is small. Then c ≥ (1 + 2.3)/9 = 0.37. They also show that the number of sibling links is small, i.e., mp m is small (e.g., 0.1). The value of ε is unknown, so we assume it small (say 0.2). The key point is that ρ is the dominant term. With the above values (11) gives γ ∼ 2.2, the same as the observed value.
As noted above, ρ is a major term determining the value of the exponent. While other researchers have reproduced the exponent by using large amounts of re-wiring and generalized preference, as far as we are aware, no model seems to have yet realized the basic fact that non-ISPs are by far the most common ASs on the topology, and possess the characteristic that no newly appearing ASs would connect to them since they do not provide Internet transit. The large observed value of ρ makes the second term in (11) small and forces the power law exponent to be greater than but close to 2.
V. THE FUTURE: SUPERLINEAR PREFERENCE AND COALESCENCE
We saw in the previous sections that rational choices made by topology-unaware ASs would result in a power-law topology. As time progresses, ASs might become aware of the topology. Even recognizing that the AS topology follows a power law is enough for ASs to change their behavior. Consider Figure 8 . The arrows indicate the direction of monetary transfer. We define the customer cone of a given AS to be the number of ASs that the AS can reach by traversing the graph in the direction opposite to monetary transfer. Thus, the customer cone is the number of ASs that can be reached "for free." In the figure, the node at the top is at economic distance zero from all other nodes, although its degree is only 4. Thus, an important metric of connectivity is not degree directly, but the size of the customer cone. In Figure 8 , the node at the top has all the other nodes in its customer cone.
Since almost all links incident to higher-degree ISPs are customer links, and all ASs connected to these customer ASs would lie in the customer cone of the ISP, its customer cone is larger than its degree. We illustrate the fact that the customer cone is superlinear in degree by annotating the RouteViews data with AS relationships using the tools in [27] . We construct three annotated AS graphs based on three data snapshots-two in 2006 and one in 2005. We remove the nodes of highest degree (< 1% of the data) due to the fact the number of data points there is too small to give statistically relevant results. All three graphs look similar, and we fit the cone size as function of AS degree with a polynomial curve. The resulting plot is shown in Figure 9 . Denoting degree by k and cone-size by ∆(k), we find that the the two are related as ∆(k) ≈ k 1.64 on average. As expected, the cone-size function is superlinear. Now, consider what would happen if a new AS that wants to connect to an existing ISP knows that the customer cone is a superlinear function of the degree. Connecting to a high degree node would ensure that one could reach a larger fraction of the ASs in one economic hop than would be possible if one connected to a lower degree ISP. Thus, even without knowing business relationships in the topology, just the knowledge that the graph follows a power law and that payments are made up the hierarchy indicates that the few large degree nodes would be more preferred attachment points than their degree would indicate. Formally, the attractiveness index of an ISP s when the total number of AS in the region is S now looks like (7). a(k s , s, t) = k
where k j is the degree of AS j and β is preference scaling factor. The exact value of β in (19) is not important for our analysis as long as β > 1. Note that if new ASs simply pick the highest degree ISP, then this strategy corresponds to the extreme form of superlinear preference with β = ∞. Proposition 2: (Proof follows directly from [19] , [30] .) If the ASs are aware of the topology and make decisions based on this knowledge, the AS-level graph evolves to a consolidated state, where the number of ISPs is infinitesimally small compared to the total graph size.
The result suggests that even a small amount of knowledge about the topology would have the effect of eliminating midlevel ISPs, i.e., a quasi-price-war develops in which customer ASs choose lower-priced alternatives even without knowledge of all prices. The result is a driving force towards oligopoly with consolidation of ISPs. Recent mergers of large ISPs in the US suggest that such consolidation might already be occurring.
VI. CONCLUSION
We derived a realistic and analytically tractable model of the growth and evolution of the Internet AS topology. Our model uses two levels of dynamic engagement of players-at the global level with clusters of ASs operating in fixed geographic regions, and at the regional level where each AS seeks choices that increase its sphere of influence. The unifying factor among regions is similar price and routing relationships between ASs. The model revealed that ASs with no knowledge of the topology would rationally choose their service providers with preference that varies linearly with degree of the candidate provider, and under such circumstances the degree distribution of the resulting topology would have a power law. Further, by splitting AS types (and their behavior) into ISP and non-ISP, and using the existing measured statistics for this splitting, our model explains the exact power law exponent of 2.2 in the observed AS degree distribution. This empirically accurate result of our model is a natural effect of the large ratio of nonISPs to ISPs, something earlier work has not considered.
Another remarkable prediction of our model deals with the state when nodes become aware of the topology, or even of its power-law characteristic. This knowledge in the hands of rational AS operators will constrain future topology, specifically toward a superlinear preference for attaching to higher-degree ISPs. Such a preference leads to consolidation of topology toward a few dominant nodes (ISPs) within each region, e.g., vertically integrated regional providers linked up by backbones. In other words, our model predicts that, ceteris paribus, natural economic forces among rational actors informed of the Internet topological characteristics will induce a gradual transition in the Internet AS topology degree distribution from a smooth power law toward a modicum of high-degree ISPs and an unbounded number of low-degree customer ASs attached to them.
